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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

31 December 1958

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International Security Affairs

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD OF LUNCHEON MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY McELROY,
MINISTER STRAUSS AND MR. IRWIN - 17 December 1958

Secretary McElroy and Minister Strauss opened the conversation with a discussion of Berlin, Minister Strauss expressing his appreciation for the firmness of the American position and stating he agreed that the West must take a firm stand. Minister Strauss said he thought all means must be used to secure Berlin and he thought statements to that effect were good, but he also wanted to have equal emphasis laid on the shield concept in order to avoid possible complacency on the part of the European nations that they need not defend themselves, that they can rely on the U.S. to do their work for them. He said there was a tendency among some in Europe to use the existence of U.S. deterrent power as a reason to slow the European build-up.

In connection with the Berlin problem, Minister Strauss said that they were reorganizing some of their infantry battalions but would be glad to stop the reorganization if it were thought advisable to do so in order that the battalions would be more combat ready in case the Berlin situation became more critical. Mr. McElroy suggested that this was a military problem and one Minister Strauss should discuss with General Norstad.

Minister Strauss said Germany was writing the United States advising them that they had decided definitely to select the F-104 for their Air Force, that they intended to buy some and produce the rest in Germany, and that they had a technical team in the United States at the present time who were receiving excellent cooperation from U.S. industry. He said, of course, Germany would continue to need technical assistance both from U.S. industry and from the U.S. Government. He understood that certain machinery used in producing the F-104 belonged to the U.S. Government, and industry could make it available only with the consent of the Government.

Minister Strauss said that he had spoken to General Norstad about the possibility of Germany taking two squadrons of IRBMs. Originally Germany had a political problem and was not able to consider IRBMs, but now the Government feels they have overcome this political problem and would like to take two squadrons. General Norstad had advised him that the United States had decided to cease production and, therefore, that this was not possible. Secretary McElroy said he thought there must be some misunderstanding on the part of General Norstad as to the production situation. It was true that we were planning to cease production after eight squadrons because there seemed to be no demand for more and that we did not need them for our own

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forces. However, if a NATO military decision were made that more IRBMs were required, and this decision was made prior to April 1, 1959, it would be possible to arrange for additional production. It would not be possible unless the decision were made before April 1st. Mr. McElroy stressed that the question was a military and political one for NATO to decide, and only thereafter did it become a matter for negotiation between Germany and the United States Government. Secretary McElroy asked Mr. Irwin to discuss this with General Norstad.

Minister Strauss next spoke of wanting to build up nuclear storage sites in Germany for German forces. He said he would like to have one completed and filled quickly, that he had mentioned this to General Norstad. Minister Strauss' belief was that if nuclear warheads were once deployed in Germany it would be easier in the future to deploy others. He said two questions were being raised by some people. One concerned a rumor that the U. S. was planning to make a package deal with the USSR at Geneva which might affect the deployment of nuclear weapons to Germany. The other was a question as to [redacted]

[redacted] If this were a fact, he thought it would be accepted and that political debate of the problem would cease. Mr. McElroy asked Mr. Irwin to discuss this matter with General Norstad.

Mr. Strauss then asked if the United States would be interested in Germany increasing its number of surface-to-surface missile units from 28, which Germany had agreed to take, to perhaps 36 or 40. However, he said this could be done only at the expense of conventional infantry or artillery battalions. He said that if there were to be any such change, he would need to know before the end of March. Mr. McElroy said that this was primarily a military decision and should be discussed with General Norstad. He asked Mr. Irwin to bring it to General Twining's and General Norstad's attention.

Mr. Strauss said that the German Government had ordered twelve conventional submarines of 300 tons and also hoped to have some fast 150 ton submarines, both types for deployment in the Baltic.

Mr. McElroy inquired as to Germany's relations with Denmark. Mr. Strauss said that [redacted]

[redacted] On the military level they were good. Mr. Strauss referred to a recent Soviet statement that Germany and Denmark must not cooperate on naval matters in the Baltic. He said that Germany was interested in having a Baltic Command established as the line between Germany and Jutland was a weak one and should be under a single command. He said that he was not asking Mr. McElroy for anything now, but he wanted to point out that it was not feasible to command ground forces in Germany from Oslo, the location of the Northern European Command. He would like to see a Baltic Command set up under the Northern European Command, although another possible solution would be to prepare for a transfer of command from European North to European

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Central in case of war. He said Germany was interested in this from a substantive point of view and was perfectly willing to have a Dane command the Baltic Command.

In discussing ways whereby our two countries could assist each other, Secretary McElroy voiced the hope that when the United States became involved in actions in other parts of the world, for example, Lebanon and Quemoy, that Chancellor Adenauer and Minister Strauss would speak out actively in favor of U.S. action. Such support from Germany would be very helpful in the world scene. Mr. Strauss agreed, spoke of his support of past U.S. actions, and of the indivisibility of freedom. He criticized the attitude of some of the German press saying they took one view on U.S. action in Lebanon and Quemoy but an opposite one on the Berlin crisis. They thought the United States should do in Germany and Berlin what they had been criticizing the United States for doing in Lebanon and Taiwan.

Mr. McElroy asked how Minister Strauss thought the Berlin problem would develop. Minister Strauss said he thought that the USSR would turn the screw very, very slowly and methodically. He said that if the U.S. ever left Berlin, it would be very difficult to hold; that he was certain that Soviet-trained provocateurs would enter in great numbers as they had in the Baltic States and Czechoslovakia with the ultimate effect being loss of Berlin.

John N. Irwin II
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